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ABSTRACT
Formal methods use SMT solvers extensively for deciding formula
satisfiability, for instance, in software verification, systematic test
generation, and program synthesis. However, due to their complex
implementations, solvers may contain critical bugs that lead to
unsound results. Given the wide applicability of solvers in software
reliability, relying on such unsound results may have detrimental
consequences. In this paper, we present STORM, a novel blackbox
mutational fuzzing technique for detecting critical bugs in SMT
solvers. We run our fuzzer on seven mature solvers and find 29
previously unknown critical bugs. STORM is already being used in
testing new features of popular solvers before deployment.
1 INTRODUCTION
The SatisfiabilityModulo Theories (SMT) problem [11] is the decision
problem of determining whether logical formulas are satisfiable
with respect to a variety of background theories. More specifically,
an SMT formula generalizes a Boolean SAT formula by supplement-
ing Boolean variables with predicates from a set of theories. As
an example, a predicate could express a linear inequality over real
variables, in which case its satisfiability is determined with the
theory of linear real arithmetic. Other theories include bitvectors,
arrays, and integers [29], to name a few.
SMT solvers, such as CVC4 [10] and Z3 [25], are complex tools
for evaluating the satisfiability of SMT instances. A typical SMT
instance contains assertions of SMT formulas and a satisfiability
check (see Figs. 2 and 3 for examples). SMT solvers are extensively
used in formal methods, most notably in software verification (e.g.,
Boogie [8] and Dafny [35]), systematic test case generation (e.g.,
KLEE [19] and Sage [31]), and program synthesis (e.g., Alive [37]).
Due to their high degree of complexity, it is all the more likely
that SMT solvers contain correctness issues, and due to their wide
applicability in software reliability, these issues may be detrimental.
Tab. 1 shows classes of bugs that may occur in SMT solvers. We
restrict the classification to bugs that manifest themselves as an
incorrect solver result. For bugs in class A, the solver is unsound and
returns unsat (i.e., unsatisfiable) for instances that are satisfiable.
Class B refers to bugs where the solver returns sat (i.e., satisfiable)
for unsatisfiable instances. A solver is incomplete when it returns
unknown for an instance that lies in a decidable theory fragment.
We categorize such bugs in class C. Finally, bugs in class D indicate
crashes where the solver does not return any result.
GT
SR
sat unsat unknown Crash
sat A C D
unsat B C D
Table 1: Classes of bugs in SMT solvers. GT stands for ground
truth and SR for solver result.
We call bugs in class A critical for two main reasons. First, such
bugsmay cause unsoundness in program analyzers that rely on SMT
solvers. As an example, consider a software verifier (e.g., Dafny [35])
or a test case generator (e.g., KLEE [19]) that checks reachability of
an error location by querying an SMT solver. If the solver unsoundly
proves that the error is unreachable (e.g., returns unsat for the path
condition to the error), then the verifier will verify incorrect code
and the testing tool will not generate inputs that exercise the error.
Second, it is much harder to safeguard against bugs in class
A than bugs in other classes. Specifically, consider that, when an
instance is found to be sat, the solver typically provides a model,
that is, an assignment to all free variables in the instance such
that it is satisfiable. Therefore, bugs in class B could be detected
by simply evaluating the instance under the model generated by
the solver (assuming that the model is correct). If this evaluation
returns false, then there is a B bug. Bugs in class C are detected
whenever the solver returns unknown for an instance that lies in a
decidable theory fragment, and bugs in class D are detected when
the solver crashes.
Related work. Early work on testing SMT solvers presented
FuzzSMT [15], a blackbox grammar-based fuzzer for generating
syntactically valid SMT instances (from scratch) for bitvectors and
arrays. Since the satisfiability of the generated formulas is unknown,
the main goal of this fuzzer is to detect crashes in solver imple-
mentations (class D). Critical bugs (class A) may only be detected
with differential testing, when multiple solvers disagree on the
satisfiability of a generated SMT instance.
The above idea was recently extended to enable fuzzing string
solvers by a tool called StringFuzz [13]. Similarly to FuzzSMT, String-
Fuzz generates formulas from scratch. In addition, it can transform
existing string instances, but without necessarily preserving their
satisfiability. Consequently, critical bugs in a single string solver
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cannot be detected given that the satisfiability of the formulas is
not known a priori—differential testing would again be needed.
Even more recently, there emerged another technique for testing
string solvers [17], which synthesizes SMT instances such that their
satisfiability is known by construction. This ground truth is used to
derive test oracles. Violating these oracles indicates bugs of classes
A and B.
Note that finding bugs in classes C and D does not require know-
ing the ground truth. As a result, any of the above techniques can
in principle detect such bugs as a by-product.
Our approach. In this paper, we present a general blackbox
fuzzing technique for detecting critical bugs in any SMT solver.
In contrast to existing work, our technique does not require a
grammar to synthesize instances from scratch. Instead, it takes
inspiration from state-of-the-art mutational fuzzers (e.g., AFL [5])
and generates new SMT instances by mutating existing ones, called
seeds. The key novelty is that our approach generates satisfiable
instances from any given seed. As a result, our fuzzer detects a
critical bug whenever an SMT solver returns unsat for one of our
generated instances. We implement our technique in a tool called
STORM, which has the additional ability to effectively minimize
the size of bug-revealing instances to facilitate debugging.
Contributions. Our paper makes the following contributions:
(1) We present a novel blackbox mutational fuzzing technique
for detecting critical bugs in SMT solvers.
(2) We implement our technique in a fuzzer that is already being
used for testing new features of solvers before deployment.
(3) We evaluate the effectiveness of our fuzzer on seven mature
solvers and 43 logics. We found 29 previously unknown
critical bugs in three solvers (or nine solver variants) and 15
different logics.
Outline. The next section gives an overview of our approach.
Sect. 3 explains the technical details, and Sect. 4 describes our
implementation. We present our experimental evaluation in Sect. 5,
discuss related work in Sect. 6, and conclude in Sect. 7.
2 OVERVIEW
To give an overview of our fuzzing technique for SMT solvers, we
first describe a few interesting examples of STORM in action and
then explain what happens under the hood on a high level.
In action. One of the critical bugs1 found by STORM was in
Z3’s QF_LIA logic, which stands for quantifier-free linear integer
arithmetic. We opened a GitHub issue to report this bug, which re-
sulted in an eight-comment discussion between two Z3 developers
on how to resolve it. The issue was closed but re-opened a day later
with more comments on what still needs to be fixed. The issue was
closed for the last time three days after that. The fix in Z3 included
changing the implementation of Gomory’s cut.
Another critical bug2 was detected in Z3’s Z3str3 string solver [12].
According to a developer of Z3str3, the bug existed for a long time
before STORM found it. During this time, it remained undetected
1https://github.com/Z3Prover/z3/issues/2871
2https://github.com/Z3Prover/z3/issues/2994
even though Z3str3 was being tested with fuzzers exclusively target-
ing string solvers [13, 17]. A simplified version of the SMT instance
that revealed the bug is shown on the right of Fig. 2. (We will discuss
it in detail later in this section.)
A third critical bug3 was found in Z3’s tactic for applying dom-
inator simplification rules. The instance that was generated by
STORM and revealed the bug spanned 194 lines. The minimization
component of STORM reduced this instance to 17 lines. A simpli-
fied version of the instance is shown on the left of Fig. 3. (We discuss
it later in this section.) A developer of the buggy tactic asked us
which application generated this instance, thinking that it was a
tool he developed during his PhD thesis. When we mentioned that
it was STORM, he replied “What? Your random generator could have
done my PhD thesis?? &@#%, you should have told me sooner :)”.
In Sect. 5, we describe in more detail our experience of using
STORM to test both mature solver implementations as well as new
features before their deployment.
Under the hood. We now give a high-level overview of our
fuzzing technique, which operates in three phases. Fig. 1 depicts
each of these phases.
The first phase, seed fragmentation, takes as input a seed SMT
instance S . For instance, imagine an instance with multiple asser-
tions. Each assertion contains a logical formula, such as f in the
figure, potentially composed of Boolean sub-formulas (i.e., predi-
cates), such as f2 ∨ f3, f1, f2, and f3 in the figure. Initially, STORM
generates a random assignment of all free variables in the formulas
in S . Then, STORM recursively fragments the formulas in S into all
their possible sub-formulas. For example, f is broken down into f1
and f2 ∨ f3, each of these is in turn broken down into its Boolean
sub-formulas, and so on. The valuation (i.e., truth value) of each
(sub-)formula,T or F , is computed based on the random assignment.
All formulas together with their valuations are inserted in an initial
pool as shown in the figure.
The second phase, formula generation, uses the formulas in the
initial pool to build new formulas. The valuation of each new for-
mula is computed based on the valuations of its constituent initial
formulas. All new formulas with their valuations are inserted in
a construction pool as shown in the figure. For instance, initial
formulas f2 and f3 are used to construct a new formula f2 ∧ f3.
The third phase, instance generation, uses formulas from both
pools to generate new SMT instances. The reason for having the
two pools is to be able to control the frequency with which initial
and constructed formulas appear in the new instances. Instances
generated during this phase have a different Boolean structure than
the seeds. However, their basic building blocks, that is, the initial
formulas that could not be fragmented further, remain unchanged.
This allows STORM to generate realistic instances as we discuss
later in this section. In addition to being realistic, all new instances
are also satisfiable by construction.
Therefore, a critical bug is detected whenever an SMT solver
returns unsat for a STORM-generated instance. In such a case,
STORM uses instance minimization to minimize the size of the
instance revealing the bug.
3https://github.com/Z3Prover/z3/issues/3052
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assert f
check-sat
Phase 1: Seed fragmentation
Seed S
∧
f1
f2 f3
∨
Formula f
f1:F f2:F f3:T
f:F
Initial pool
Phase 2: Formula
generation
¬f1:T
f2 ∧ f3:F
Construction pool
¬f1 ∧ f3:T
¬(¬f1 ∧ f2):T
assert ¬f2
assert ¬f1 ∧ f3
check-sat
Phase 3: Instance
generation
New instance
¬f2:T
f2 ∨ f3:T
Figure 1: Overview of the three STORM phases.
1 (declare-const S String)
2 (assert (str.in.re S (re.++ re.allchar (re.++
3 (str.to.re "7;") (re.++ re.allchar
4 (str.to.re "aa "))))))
5 (assert (not (str.in.re S (re.union re.allchar
6 (str.to.re "X'jafa ")))))
7 (check-sat)
1 (declare-const S String)
2 (assert
3 (let ((a (str.in.re S (re.++ re.allchar (re.++
4 (str.to.re "7;") (re.++ re.allchar
5 (str.to.re "aa "))))))
6 (let ((b (not (str.in.re S (re.union re.allchar
7 (str.to.re "X'jafa "))))))
8 (let ((c (and (not b) (not a))))
9 (not c))))))
10 (check-sat)
Figure 2: Original seed instance from SMT-COMP 2019 on the left, and simplified instance revealing critical bug in Z3’s Z3str3
string solver on the right.
1 (declare-fun A () Bool)
2 (declare-fun B () Bool)
3
4 (assert (not B))
5 (assert (not (and (not A) B)))
6 (assert A)
7
8 (check-sat-using dom-simplify)
1 (declare-fun A () Bool)
2 (declare-fun B () Bool)
3
4 (assert (and (not B) A))
5
6 (check-sat-using dom-simplify)
Figure 3: Simplified instance revealing critical bug in Z3’s dom-simplify tactic on the left, and logically equivalent instance
not revealing the bug on the right.
Examples. The left of Fig. 2 shows a seed instance from the
international SMT competition SMT-COMP 2019 [3]. Starting from
this seed, STORM generated the (simplified) instance on the right,
which revealed the critical bug in Z3str3 described above. Z3str3
derives length constraints from regular-expression membership
predicates. The bug that STORM exposed here is that such a length
constraint, which is implied by membership in a regular expression,
was not asserted by the string solver.
It is easy to see that the first asserted formula on the left corre-
sponds to variable a on the right, while the second asserted formula
on the left corresponds to variable b on the right. Therefore, the
seed essentially checks for satisfiability of a ∧ b. On the right, c
is equivalent to ¬a ∧ ¬b, and the instance checks for satisfiability
of ¬c, thus, of a ∨ b. This shows that even small mutations to the
Boolean structure of a formula can be effective in revealing critical
issues in solvers.
This is also evidenced by the example in Fig. 3. The instance
on the left reveals the critical bug in Z3’s dom-simplify tactic
described earlier. It essentially checks the satisfiability of ¬B ∧
¬(¬A ∧ B) ∧ A, which is logically equivalent to ¬B ∧ A. Observe,
however, that the logically equivalent formula, shown on the right
of Fig. 3, does not trigger the bug.
Consequently, the benefit of fuzzing the Boolean structure of
seed instances is two-fold. First, it is effective in detecting critical
issues in solvers. Such issues are by definition far more serious
and complex than other types of bugs, such as crashes, since they
can, for instance, result in verifying incorrect safety-critical code.
Second, fuzzing only the Boolean structure of seeds helps generate
realistic SMT instances. This is confirmed by the above comments
on the tactic bug from the Z3 developer who thought that the
STORM instance was generated by his own PhD tool. This was also
confirmed by other solver developers with whom we interacted.
3 OUR APPROACH
In this section, we describe our fuzzing technique and how it solves
two key challenges in detecting critical bugs in SMT solvers: (1) how
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to generate non-trivial SMT instances, and (2) how to determine
if a critical bug is exposed. The latter demonstrates how STORM
addresses the oracle problem [9] in the context of soundness testing
for solvers. Finally, we describe how we minimize bug-revealing in-
stances to reduce their size. This step is crucial for solver developers
as it significantly facilitates debugging.
3.1 Fuzzing Technique
Given an SMT instance as seed input, our fuzzing approach pro-
ceeds in three main phases: (1) seed fragmentation, (2) formula
generation, and (3) instance generation. Seed fragmentation ex-
tracts sub-formulas from the seed. These will be used as building
blocks for generating new formulas in the second phase. Lastly,
instance generation creates new, satisfiable SMT instances based
on the generated formulas, invokes the SMT solver under test on
each of these instances, and uses the solver result as part of the test
oracle to detect critical bugs.
Alg. 1 describes these three phases in detail. Function Fuzz takes
the initial seed S and several additional parameters that bound
the fuzzing process (explained below). As a first step, the function
populates an initial pool Pinit of formulas (line 13) with formula
fragments of the seed S.
To this purpose, function PopulateInitialPool extracts all as-
sertions in the seed and generates a random assignment M , i.e.,
an assignment of values to free variables. In our implementation,
we use a separate SMT solver (i.e., different from the one under
test) to generate a model for the assertions (or their negation if the
assertions are unsatisfiable). Next, we iterate over all predicates
(i.e., tree-shaped Boolean sub-formulas as in Fig. 1) in the seed. We
use assignment M to evaluate those predicates for which the tree
depth does not exceed a bound Dmax . This valuation v is crucial
for subsequent phases of the fuzzing process, and we add both
the formula pred and v to the initial pool, which is essentially a
map from formulas to valuations. Note that, by fragmenting the
seed, the initial pool already contains a large number of non-trivial
formulas that would be difficult to generate from scratch (e.g., with
a grammar-based fuzzer).
In the second phase, we populate the construction pool Pconstr by
adding NC new formulas of maximum depth Dmax . These formulas
are generated randomly by selecting one of two Boolean operators,
logical AND (lines 21–23) and NOT (lines 25–26). Note that this set
of operators is functionally complete, thus allowing us to generate
any Boolean formula. We construct a new formula by conjoining
two existing formulas in the case of AND and negating an exist-
ing formula in the case of NOT . Existing formulas are randomly
selected from the pools. Before adding the resulting formula to the
construction pool, we derive its valuation v from the valuations of
its sub-formulas (lines 23 and 26).
In essence, the second phase enriches the set of existing formulas
by generating new ones without requiring a complete grammar for
all syntactic constructs. Instead, we use a minimal, but functionally
complete, grammar for Boolean formulas. This significantly simpli-
fies formula generation without sacrificing expressiveness. Note
that a separate pool for newly constructed formulas allows having
control over how many of them are used in the instances generated
in the third phase. On the right of Fig. 2, this step is responsible for
Algorithm 1: Core fuzzing procedure in STORM.
1 procedure PopulateInitialPool(S, Dmax )
2 A← GetAsserts(S)
3 M ← RandAssignment(A)
4 P ← EmptyPool()
5 foreach pred ∈ S
6 if ¬ExceedsDepth(pred, Dmax ) then
7 v ← IsTrue(M, pred)
8 P ← Add(P, pred, v)
9 return P
10
11 procedure Fuzz(S, NC, NM, Dmax, Amax )
12 // Phase 1: Seed fragmentation
13 Pinit ← PopulateInitialPool(S, Dmax )
14
15 // Phase 2: Formula generation
16 Pconstr ← EmptyPool()
17 while Size(Pconstr ) < NC do
18 f1, v1 ← RandFormula(Pinit, Pconstr)
19 op← RandOp()
20 if op = AND then
21 f2, v2 ← RandFormula(Pinit, Pconstr)
22 f ← AND(f1, f2)
23 v ← v1 ∧ v2
24 else
25 f ← NOT (f1)
26 v ← ¬v1
27 if ¬ExceedsDepth(f , Dmax ) then
28 Pconstr ← Add(Pconstr, f, v)
29
30 // Phase 3: Instance generation
31 B← EmptyList()
32 m← 0
33 while m < NM do
34 // Number of generated assertions
35 ac ← (RandInt()%Amax ) + 1
36 A← EmptyList()
37 while 0 < ac do
38 f , v ← RandFormula(Pinit, Pconstr)
39 if ¬v then
40 // Negation of f to guarantee assertion satisfiability
41 f ← NOT (f )
42 A← Append(A, f)
43 ac ← ac − 1
44 // Invocation of SMT solver under test
45 r ← CheckSAT(A)
46 // Test oracle
47 if r = UNSAT then
48 B← Append(B, A)
49 m← m + 1
50 return B
generating the formulas on lines 8 and 9 that ultimately amount to
checking the satisfiability of a ∨ b.
Once the two pools are populated, we use them to generate NM
SMT instances that we feed to the solver under test. To assemble
a new instance, we create a random number of assertions (ac on
line 35) by randomly picking formulas from the pools. If the valua-
tion of a selected formula is true, we directly assert it, otherwise we
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Algorithm 2: Depth-minimization procedure in STORM.
1 procedureMinimizeDepth(S, NC, NM, Dmin, Dmax, Amax )
2 if Dmax ≤ Dmin then
3 return S
4 D← (Dmin + Dmax )/2
5 B← Fuzz(S, NC, NM, D, Amax )
6 if 0 < Size(B) then
7 Smin ← SelectSeedWithSmallestDepth(B)
8 returnMinimizeDepth(Smin, NC, NM, Dmin, D, Amax )
9 returnMinimizeDepth(S, NC, NM, D + 1, Dmax, Amax )
assert its negation. This ensures that all assertions are satisfiable.
Of course, the same holds for the SMT instance consisting of these
assertions in addition to a satisfiability check. We now leverage this
fact when feeding the SMT instance to the solver under test (line 45).
The oracle reveals a critical bug if the solver returns UNSAT .
3.2 Instance Minimization
In practice, our fuzzing technique often generates bug-revealing
instances that are very large, containing deeply nested formulas
and several assertions. This can considerably complicate debugging
for solver developers.
Adapting established minimization techniques based on delta
debugging [46] might seem like a natural fit for this use case. How-
ever, the special nature of critical bugs complicates this task in
comparison to other classes of bugs, such as crashes. For mini-
mizing crashing instances, it is sufficient to minimize the original
instance (e.g., by dropping assertions) while preserving the crash. In
contrast, for instances that exhibit a critical bug, the behavior that
should be preserved is more involved, that is, the instance should
be minimized such that the buggy solver still returns unsat while
the ground truth remains sat. This requires either satisfiability-
preserving minimizations or a trusted second solver that can act
as a ground-truth oracle by rejecting minimizations that do not
preserve satisfiability. Unfortunately, the only state-of-the-art delta
debugger for SMT instances, ddSMT [41], does not preserve satisfi-
ability. (Note that ddSMT is the successor of deltaSMT [2], which
was used to minimize instances generated by FuzzSMT [15].) More-
over, a second trusted solver is not always available (e.g., for new
theories or solver-specific features and extensions).
To overcome these limitations, we developed a specialized mini-
mization technique that directly leverages the bounds of our fuzzing
procedure to obtain smaller instances (see Alg. 2 for depth mini-
mization). By repeatedly running the fuzzing procedure on a buggy
seed instance, this algorithm attempts to find the minimum values
for Dmax and Amax that still reveal a critical bug. It uses binary
search to first minimize the number of assertions (analogous to
MinimizeDepth in Alg. 2) and subsequently the depth of asserted
formulas. Note that the fuzzing procedure may report multiple
bug-revealing instances, and we recursively minimize the smallest
with respect to the bound being minimized (line 8). Our evaluation
shows that this technique works more reliably than leveraging
ddSMT and a second solver (see Sect. 5.5).
4 IMPLEMENTATION
Seeds. STORM uses the Python API in Z3 to manipulate SMT
formulas for generating new instances. It can, therefore, only fuzz
instances within the logics supported by Z3. In practice, this is not
an important restriction since Z3 supports a very large number
of logics. Moreover, STORM requires seeds to be expressed in an
extension of the SMT-LIB v2 input format [4] supported by Z3. Note
that SMT-LIB is the standard input format used across solvers.
Random assignments. Recall that STORM uses Z3 to generate
a random model for a given seed (line 3 of Alg. 1). Note, however,
that bugs in Z3 resulting in a wrong model do not affect our fuzzer.
In fact, given any assignment, our technique just requires correct
valuations for predicates in the initial pool. In theory, computing
these valuations is relatively straightforward since the assignment
provides concrete values for all free variables; simply substituting
variables with values should be sufficient for quantifier-free predi-
cates. In practice, we use Z3 to compute predicate valuations and
have not encountered any bugs in this solver component.
Random choices. Our implementation provides concrete in-
stantiations of functions RandOp and RandFormula from Alg. 1
as follows. RandOp returns AND with probability 50% and NOT
otherwise. Function RandFormula selects a formula from one of
the pools uniformly at random, but with probability 30% from the
initial pool and from the construction pool otherwise.
Incremental mode. Many solvers support a feature called in-
cremental mode. It allows client tools to push and pop constraints
when performing a large number of similar satisfiability queries
(e.g., checking feasibility of paths with a common prefix during sym-
bolic execution). To efficiently support this mode, solvers typically
use dedicated algorithms that reuse results from previous queries;
in fact, SMT-COMP [3] features a separate track to evaluate these
algorithms. To test incremental mode, STORM is able to generate
SMT instances that contain push and pop instructions in addition
to regular assertions.
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we address the following research questions:
RQ1: How effective is STORM in detecting new critical bugs
in SMT solvers?
RQ2: How effective is STORM in detecting known critical bugs
in SMT solvers?
RQ3: How do the assertion and depth bounds of STORM im-
pact its effectiveness?
RQ4: How effective is our instance minimization at reducing
the size of bug-revealing instances?
RQ5: To what extent do STORM-generated instances increase
code coverage of SMT solvers?
5.1 Solver Selection
We used STORM to test seven popular SMT solvers, which sup-
port the SMT-LIB input format [4] and regularly participate in the
international SMT competition SMT-COMP [3]. Specifically, we se-
lected Boolector [14], CVC4 [10], MathSAT5 [21], SMTInterpol [20],
STP [30], Yices2 [27], and Z3 [25].
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In addition to the above mature implementations, STORM was
also used to test new features of solvers. In particular, the develop-
ers of Yices2 asked us to test the new bitvector theory in the MCSAT
solver [32] of Yices2, which is based on the model-constructing
satisfiability calculus [26]. MCSAT is an optional component of
Yices2, which is dedicated to quantifier-free non-linear real arith-
metic. STORM did not find bugs in this new theory of MCSAT, and
the theory was integrated with the main version of Yices2 shortly
after. In our experimental evaluation, it is therefore tested as part
of Yices2.
Moreover, the developers of Z3 asked us to test a new arithmetic
solver (let us refer to it as Z3-AS), which they have been preparing
for the last two years. It comes with better non-linear theories and
has just replaced the legacy arithmetic solvers in Z3. According to
the Z3 developers, STORM could help expedite the integration of
this new feature by finding bugs early, which it did. Since Z3-AS
has just now been integrated with the current version of Z3 and we
have only been testing it independently, we include it separately in
our evaluation.
Due to the success of STORM in detecting intricate critical bugs
in Z3-AS, the Z3 developers described our fuzzer as being “extremely
useful” and have now asked us to test Z3’s current debug branch
(let us refer to it as Z3-DBG). Z3-DBG implements a variety of new
solver features in which STORM has already detected a critical bug
(see Sect. 5.5).
Finally, the developers of the Z3str3 string solver [12] asked us
to provide them with STORM-generated string instances. They
became aware of STORM since it detected several critical issues
in Z3str3, which we reported. Note that Z3str3 is developed by
the same group of people as StringFuzz [13]. We, therefore, sus-
pect that STORM found bugs in Z3str3 that StringFuzz could not
find, especially since StringFuzz does not target critical bugs. The
STORM-generated instances that we provided (in addition to the
bug-revealing ones that we reported) were used as a regression
test suite during the development of performance enhancements
in Z3str3. According to a developer of Z3str3, our instances helped
reveal critical bugs introduced by these enhancements. Most of
these bugs were due to missing or incorrect axioms in Z3str3.
5.2 Logic Selection
In our experimental evaluation, for each solver, we test the inter-
section of all logics supported by the solver, all logics supported
by the SMT-LIB input format, and all logics supported by Z3. The
latter constraint emerges because our implementation relies on Z3
for generating the mutated SMT instances (see Sect. 4).
Tab. 2 shows the tested logics for each solver. (The second co-
lumn and second to last row of the table should be ignored for
now.) The logic abbreviations are explained in the SMT-LIB stan-
dard [4], but generally speaking, the following rules hold. QF stands
for quantifier-free formulas, A for arrays, AX for arrays with ex-
tensionality, BV for bitvectors, FP for floating-point arithmetic, IA
for integer arithmetic, RA for real arithmetic, IRA for integer real
arithmetic, IDL for integer difference logic, RDL for rational diffe-
rence logic, L before IA, RA, or IRA for the linear fragment of these
arithmetics, N before IA, RA, or IRA for the non-linear fragment, UF
for the extension that allows free sort and function symbols, S for
strings, and DT for datatypes.
5.3 Benchmark Selection
For our experiments, we used as seeds all non-incremental SMT-
LIB instances in SMT-COMP 2019 [3]. We also used all SMT-LIB
instances in the regression test suites of CVC4, Yices2, and Z3. The
second column of Tab. 2 shows how many seeds correspond to each
tested logic. The second to last row of the table (“Unsp.”) refers to
instances in which the logic is unspecified—the solver may use any.
In general, we only tested each solver with logics, and thus
instances, it supports. For seeds without a specified logic, we only
generated mutations of those that each solver could handle.
5.4 Experimental Setup
For our experiments, we used the following setting for STORM
unless stated otherwise: Dmax = 64, Amax = 64, NC between 200
and 1500, and NM between 300 and 1000 (see Alg. 1). Both NC and
NM were adjusted dynamically within the above ranges based on
the size of the initial pool. The goal was to use larger values for
larger initial pools, and thus, larger seeds.
We performed all experiments on a 32-core Intel ® Xeon ® E5-
2667 v2 CPU @ 3.30GHz machine with 256GB of memory, running
Debian GNU/Linux 10 (buster).
Comparisonwith state of the art. Except for a single tool [17],
all existing testing tools for SMT solvers do not use oracles to detect
critical bugs. They, therefore, require differential testing of multiple
solvers to identify such bugs. In RQ2, we evaluate the effectiveness
of STORM at detecting existing critical bugs, including the only
publicly reported one found by the most closely related tool [17].
Recall that this tool supports only the theory of strings.
5.5 Experimental Results
We now discuss our experimental results for each of the above
research questions.
RQ1: New critical bugs. Tab. 3 shows critical bugs found by
STORM in the SMT solvers we tested. The first column of the table
shows the solvers. We list Z3str3 separately as it is not the default
string solver in Z3. The second column denotes whether bugs were
found in the incremental mode of a solver, which essentially corre-
sponds to a different solver variant. The third column lists the logics
in which bugs were found, and the last column shows the number of
bugs. Overall, STORM found 29 critical bugs in three mature
solvers (or nine solver variants) and 15 different logics.
All of these bugs are previously unknown, unique, and confirmed
by the solver developers. Out of the 29 critical bugs, 19 have already
been fixed in the latest solver versions. Note that the bugs were only
detected by STORM-generated instances, i.e., none were detected
by the seeds. In addition to the bugs in the table, STORM was also
able to detect known bugs as well as other issues (i.e., of classes C
and D) as a by-product, which we do not report here.
The feedback we receive from solver developers is very positive,
and we have been discussing it throughout the paper. As another
example, a Yices2 developer told us that STORM found real bugs
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SMT Solvers
Logic Seeds Boolector CVC4 MathSAT5 SMTInterpol STP Yices2 Z3
ALIA 42 ✓ ✓ ✓
AUFNIA 3 ✓ ✓
LRA 2444 ✓ ✓ ✓
QF_ALIA 42 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
QF_AUFNIA 3 ✓ ✓ ✓
QF_DT 1602 ✓ ✓
QF_LRA 1049 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
QF_RDL 261 ✓ ✓ ✓
QF_UFIDL 444 ✓ ✓ ✓
QF_UFNRA 38 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
UFDTLIA 327 ✓ ✓
AUFDTLIA 728 ✓ ✓
AUFNIRA 1490 ✓ ✓
NIA 14 ✓ ✓
QF_ANIA 8 ✓ ✓ ✓
QF_AX 555 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
QF_FP 40418 ✓ ✓ ✓
QF_NIA 23901 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
QF_S 24323 ✓ ✓
QF_UFLIA 580 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
UFLIA 9524 ✓ ✓ ✓
AUFLIA 3273 ✓ ✓ ✓
BV 5750 ✓ ✓ ✓
NRA 3813 ✓ ✓
QF_AUFBV 49 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
QF_BV 3872 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
QF_IDL 843 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
QF_NIRA 3 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
QF_UF 7481 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
QF_UFLRA 936 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
UF 7596 ✓ ✓ ✓
UFLRA 17 ✓ ✓ ✓
AUFLIRA 2268 ✓ ✓ ✓
LIA 388 ✓ ✓ ✓
QF_ABV 8310 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
QF_AUFLIA 1310 ✓ ✓ ✓
QF_BVFP 17196 ✓ ✓ ✓
QF_LIA 2104 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
QF_NRA 4067 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
QF_UFBV 1238 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
QF_UFNIA 478 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
UFDT 4527 ✓ ✓
UFNIA 4446 ✓ ✓
Unsp. 5825 – – – – – – –
Total 193586 5 43 10 17 1 19 43
Table 2: The tested logics per solver and the number of seed instances per logic.
and that it is especially useful to have the ability to test the incre-
mental mode of solvers. He also mentioned that they used to run
FuzzSMT [15] on all theories, and that now this fuzzer runs conti-
nuously on new theories generating “infinite” instances. FuzzSMT,
however, does not target critical bugs, and for this reason, they
run VoteSMT [6] to differentially test solvers and detect incorrect
Yices2 results. Despite this, STORM detected four new critical bugs
in Yices2.
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SMT Incremental Logics CriticalSolver Mode Bugs
MathSAT5 QF_FP 2
QF_BVFP
Yices2 QF_UFIDL 2
QF_UF
Yices2 ✓ QF_UFIDL 2
QF_UFLRA
Z3
QF_UFLIA
8
QF_BV
UF
LIA
QF_BVFP
QF_LIA
Z3 ✓ QF_FP 3
QF_S
Z3str3 QF_S 6
Z3-AS
AUFNIRA
4QF_NIA
AUFLIRA
QF_NRA
Z3-AS ✓ AUFNIRA 1
Z3-DBG QF_NIA 1
Table 3: Previously unknown, unique, and confirmed critical
bugs found by STORM in the tested SMT solvers.
Another Yices2 developer commented on the severity of two of
the bugs that STORM found. He mentioned that one was in the
pre-processing component and “easy to fix (and an obvious mistake
in retrospect) but it was in a part of Yices that had probably not been
exercised much”. “The other one was much more tricky to trace and
fix, it was related to a combination of features and optimization in
the E-graph, not localized to a single module”.
RQ2: Known critical bugs. In this research question, we evalu-
ate the effectiveness of STORM in reproducing known critical bugs.
We, therefore, collected all critical bugs that were reported for the
solvers under test during the three-month period between Nov 15
and Feb 15, 2020. We focused only on bugs with a subsequent fix
(i.e., closed issues on GitHub). Out of the seven solvers, we exclude
MathSAT5 because it is closed source, and bugs may only be re-
ported via email. We also exclude Boolector, SMTInterpol, and STP
because no critical bugs were reported for these solvers during the
above time period. For the remaining three solvers, CVC4, Yices2,
and Z3, there were 6, 1, and 14 critical bugs with a fix, respectively,
after excluding all the bugs that we reported.
We ran STORM on the solver version in which each bug was
found. Since developers typically add fixed bugs to their regression
tests, we removed all seeds that revealed any of these bugs (without
being mutated). We collected all generated instances for which
each solver incorrectly returned unsat. To ensure that STORM
actually found the reported bug (and not a different one), we ran
all bug-revealing instances against the first solver version with the
corresponding fix. If the solver now returned sat for at least one
of the instances, we counted the bug as reproduced.
For each of the three solvers, STORM was able to reproduce 1
(CVC4), 1 (Yices2), and 4 (Z3) critical bugs, so 6 out of a total of
21. Therefore, if STORM had run on these solver versions, it
would have prevented approximately 1/3 of the critical-bug
reports in a three-month period. Given that during this period
we reported 10 additional bugs detected by STORM in these solvers,
it is possible that our fuzzer would have been able to reproduce
more bugs if it had run longer or if it was being run continuously.
We also tried to find the bugs reported by Bugariu andMüller [17]
(regardless of when theywere reported). Therewas only oneGitHub
issue opened by these authors about a critical bug, namely in the
Z3str3 string solver. STORM was able to reproduce this bug.
RQ3: Fuzzing bounds. To evaluate the effect of the fuzzing
bounds of STORM, we only considered closed bugs. We used all
19 closed bugs reported by us from RQ1 except for those in Z3-AS
(the original commits could not be retrieved due to a rebase in
the branch) for a remaining of 14 bugs. In addition, we used all 7
reproduced bugs (including the one reported by Bugariu et. al. [17])
from RQ2 for a total of 21 bugs.
For each of these bugs we randomly selected a seed file that had
allowed STORM to detect the bug in RQ1 or RQ2. We performed
eight independent runs of STORM (with random seeds different
from the ones used in RQ1 and RQ2 to avoid bias) to evaluate
the effect of the different fuzzing bounds. None of the STORM
configurations was able to reproduce two of the Yices2 bugs from
RQ1with any of the eight random seeds; we therefore do not include
those in the results shown in Fig. 4.
For the assertion and depth bounds Amax and Dmax , we used
five different settings: 4, 8, 16, 32, and 64. Fig. 4 shows the median
number of iterations (i.e., generated instances) until the bug was
found for different combinations of these settings. We can observe
that a large assertion bound reduces the number of iterations
significantly (e.g., up to 11x forDmax = 4). In contrast, the trend
for the depth bound is less clear, which suggests that it has a less
significant effect and is mostly useful for minimizing instances. We
can observe very similar trends when comparing the median time
to find the bug (see Fig. 5).
RQ4: Instance minimization. We now evaluate the effective-
ness of our instance minimization. To this end, we collect all in-
stances revealing the 19 bugs of RQ3 that are generated by STORM
with its default configuration (Sect. 5.4).
The results of minimizing these instances using binary search
(BS) and delta debugging (ddSMT [41]) are shown in Tab. 4. Instance
size is measured in terms of the number of bytes, the number of
assertions, and the maximum formula depth in an assertion. A dash
for ddSMT means either that the instance could not be minimized
or that ddSMT does not support a construct in the instance. As
outlined in Sect. 3.2, we had to adapt ddSMT for this use case by
invoking a second solver to reject minimizations that would not
preserve satisfiability; we used the version of the solver that fixed
the corresponding bug for this purpose.
Despite these adaptations, we observed that ddSMT could not
minimize the instances for bugs 2, 3, 4, 5, 13, 14, and 18. We suspect
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Figure 4: Median number of iterations to find bugs with different configurations of STORM. Each bar corresponds to a confi-
guration with a certain depth and assertion bound.
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Figure 5: Median time (in seconds) to find bugs with different configurations of STORM. Each bar corresponds to a confi-
guration with a certain depth and assertion bound.
that its search space of possible minimizations might not contain
more complex transformations that would be required to both pre-
serve satisfiability and the bug. We observed the same outcome
when running ddSMT on instances that were first minimized using
binary search.
For bugs 10 and 11, ddSMT does not support str.to.re , which
is supported by Z3’s Z3str3 solver. For the remaining bugs (7, 8,
9, 12, 15, and 16), ddSMT does not support check-sat-using ,
which is supported by Z3. Recall that STORM accepts seed instances
expressed in the extension of the SMT-LIB format that is supported
by Z3 (Sect. 4), whereas ddSMT only supports the standard.
Overall, this experiment shows that our minimization proce-
dure works more reliably and is able to significantly reduce
buggy instances (median reduction of 86.1%).However, for the
cases where both procedures produced results, the ddSMT-based
minimization procedure was able to produce smaller instances.
This is not entirely surprising given that BS uses the fuzzer, which
treats predicates not containing other predicates (i.e., ground- or
leaf-predicates) as atomic building blocks. For instance, for Bug 17,
the instance that was minimized with BS contains several complex
ground-predicates that ddSMT is able to minimize further. We ex-
pect that more involved combinations of the two approaches could
produce even better results.
RQ5: Code coverage. A Yices2 developer mentioned that they
use fuzzer-generated instances to enrich their regression tests such
that they achieve higher coverage. In this research question, we
therefore evaluate whether STORM is able to increase coverage.
We selected one of the solvers (Z3) and four random logics in
which we found bugs (QF_UFLIA, AUFNIRA, UF, LIA). We then
computed the line and function coverage when running Z3 on all
the instances from SMT-COMP 2019 [3] for these logics (10054
seeds). The result is shown in the first row of Tab. 5. At the same
time, we randomly selected 5 instances from each logic and ran
STORM with NM = 500 and a single new random seed to ge-
nerate exactly 500 new instances for each of the 20 seed instances.
Tab. 5 shows that, as more instances are generated, coverage in-
creases noticeably (2958 more lines and 1149 more functions after
only 500 generated instances). This demonstrates that running
STORM on only a small number of seed instances is able to
result in a noticeable coverage increase over a large number
of instances from a well known benchmark set.
5.6 Threats to Validity
We identify the following threats to the validity of our experiments.
Selection of seeds. STORM requires seed instances as input,
and our experimental results do not necessarily generalize to other
seeds [43]. However, we selected as seeds all supported instances
from SMT-COMP 2019 [3] as well as regression test suites of solvers.
We believe that our selection is sufficiently broad to mitigate this
threat.
Selection of solvers. The bugs found by STORM depend on the
solvers and logics that we tested. However, we selected a wide
range of different, mature solvers and logics to mitigate this threat.
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Bug Unminimized Minimized Minimized
ID Instances by BS by ddSMT
1 56832/ 51/ 12 11687/ 38/ 6 272/ 3/ 3
2 11623/ 30/ 2 7541/ 24/ 2 –/ –/ –
3 15156/ 30/ 2 5663/ 24/ 2 –/ –/ –
4 73656/ 63/ 3 12983/ 15/ 1 –/ –/ –
5 75040/ 54/ 10 15972/ 50/ 3 –/ –/ –
6 54326/ 27/ 4 8466/ 6/ 3 507/ 3/ 1
7 13160/ 37/ 5 1253/ 5/ 3 –/ –/ –
8 9301/ 26/ 2 629/ 3/ 2 –/ –/ –
9 8209/ 21/ 6 1138/ 3/ 3 –/ –/ –
10 401/ 1/ 1 401/ 1/ 1 –/ –/ –
11 15322/ 33/ 4 8342/ 16/ 3 –/ –/ –
12 13682/ 40/ 3 282/ 1/ 2 –/ –/ –
13 8677/ 57/ 2 660/ 4/ 1 –/ –/ –
14 12294/ 32/ 3 1698/ 6/ 2 –/ –/ –
15 26110/ 23/ 4 1171/ 1/ 2 –/ –/ –
16 55423/ 29/ 5 22660/ 12/ 2 –/ –/ –
17 96844/ 55/ 59 2204/ 4/ 2 260/ 1/ 1
18 20282/ 38/ 4 791/ 4/ 1 –/ –/ –
19 7117/ 22/ 4 384/ 1/ 1 172/ 1/ 1
Table 4: Size of original and minimized bug-revealing in-
stances. Instance size is shown in terms of the number of
bytes / number of assertions / maximum formula depth.
Randomness in fuzzing. A common threat when evaluating
fuzzers is related to the internal validity [43] of their results. To
mitigate systematic errors that may be introduced due to random
choices of our fuzzer, we used random seeds to ensure deterministic
results and performed experiments for eight different seeds.
6 RELATEDWORK
SMT solvers are core components in many program analyzers,
and as a result, their reliability is of crucial importance. Although
it is feasible to verify SAT and SMT algorithms [28, 36, 38], it is
challenging and time consuming to verify even very basic SAT-
or SMT-solver implementations. Verifying state-of-the-art, high-
performance solver implementations, such as CVC4 [10] and Z3 [25],
is completely impractical. For these reasons, there is a growing in-
terest in testing such solvers, alongside related efforts that focus
on testing entire program analyzers.
Testing SAT and SMT solvers. FuzzSMT [15] focuses on find-
ing crashes of SMT solvers for bitvector and array instances. It
uses grammar-based blackbox fuzzing to generate crash-inducing
instances and minimizes any such instances with delta debug-
ging [2, 46]. Brummayer et al. [16] extend this line of work to
SAT and QBF solvers. In contrast, STORM performs mutational
fuzzing, and its minimization procedure leverages the fuzzer and its
bounds regarding the number of assertions and the formula depth.
StringFuzz [13] targets testing of string solvers. In addition to
randomly generating syntactically valid instances using a grammar,
it is also able to mutate or transform formulas in existing instances.
However, since not all of its transformations preserve satisfiability,
it is not easily possible to leverage metamorphic testing [9] to
Generated Line Function
Instances Coverage Coverage
0 43607 21238
100 45433 22005
200 45575 22067
300 45582 22068
400 46402 22369
500 46565 22387
Table 5: Code coverage increase as more instances are gene-
rated by STORM.
detect critical bugs. In contrast to both FuzzSMT and StringFuzz,
the satisfiability of all STORM-generated instances is known.
Recently, Bugariu andMüller [17] proposed an automated testing
technique that synthesizes small SMT instances for the string the-
ory. The true satisfiability of the generated instances is derived by
construction and used as a test oracle. In contrast, STORM performs
mutational fuzzing and supports a wide range of theories.
Unlike the above approaches that fuzz the input instances of
solvers, Artho et al. [7] and Niemetz et al. [42] develop model-based
API testing frameworks for SAT and SMT solvers. These focus on
testing various API parameters and solver options.
Testing program analyzers. Kapus and Cadar [33] combine
random program generation with differential testing [40] to find
bugs in symbolic-execution engines. Their technique is inspired by
existing compiler-testing techniques (e.g., Csmith [45]) and used to
test KLEE [19], CREST [1], and FuzzBALL [39].
Cuoq et al. [24] use randomly generated programs to test the
Frama-C static-analysis platform [22]. Bugariu et al. [18] present
a fuzzing technique for detecting soundness and precision issues
in implementations of abstract domains—the core components of
abstract interpreters [23]. They use algebraic properties of abstract
domains as test oracles and find bugs in widely used domains.
Recently, Taneja et al. [44] proposed a testing technique for identi-
fying soundness and precision issues in static dataflow analyses by
comparing results with a sound and maximally precise SMT-based
analysis; they rely on the SMT solver to provide correct results.
Zhang et al. [47] develop a practical and automated fuzzing
technique to test software model checkers. They focus on testing
control-flow reachability properties of programs. More specifically,
they synthesize valid branch reachability properties using concrete
program executions and then fuse individual properties of different
branches into a single safety property.
Klinger et al. [34] propose an automated technique to test the
soundness and precision of program analyzers in general. Their
approach is based on differential testing. From seed programs, they
generate program-analysis benchmarks on which they compare
the results of different analyzers.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a novel fuzzing technique for de-
tecting critical bugs in SMT solvers—key components of many state-
of-the-art program analyzers. Conceptually, STORM is a blackbox
mutational fuzzer that uses fragments of existing SMT instances
to generate new, realistic instances. Its formula-generation phase
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takes inspiration from grammar-based fuzzers; it leverages a mini-
mal, but functionally complete, grammar for Boolean formulas to
generate new formulas from fragments found in seeds. Finally, it
solves the oracle problem by generating instances that are satisfi-
able by construction. STORM found 29 previously unknown critical
bugs in three solvers (or nine solver variants) and 15 different logics.
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